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• Interest rate swaps and currency swaps are
contracts in which counterparties agree to
exchange cash ﬂows according to a pre-arranged
formula. In its capacity as ﬁscal agent for the
federal government, the Bank of Canada has
carried out swap agreements since ﬁscal year
1984/85.
• The government uses these swap agreements to
obtain cost-effective ﬁnancing, to fund its foreign
exchange reserves, and to permit ﬂexibility in
managing its liabilities.
• To minimize its exposure to counterparty credit
risk, the government applies strict credit-rating
criteria and conservative exposure limits based on
a methodology developed by the Bank for
International Settlements.
• Between ﬁscal 1987/88 and 1994/95, the
government used domestic interest rate swaps to
convert ﬁxed-rate debt into ﬂoating-rate debt.
Currently, the government uses interest rate
swaps and currency swaps to convert its
Canadian-dollar-denominated debt into foreign
currency liabilities and to exchange foreign
currency, ﬁxed-rate issues into foreign currency,
ﬂoating-rate debt.
• The government’s swap program is cost-effective.
The estimated past and projected savings on
transactions undertaken since 1988 for which
there are reliable cost comparisons amount to over
$500 million.
 swap agreement is a contract in which
two counterparties arrange to exchange
cash-ﬂow streams over a period of time
according to a pre-arranged formula. Two
of the most common swap agreements are interest rate
swaps and currency swaps. In an interest rate swap,
counterparties exchange a series of interest payments
denominated in the same currency; in a currency
swap, counterparties exchange a series of interest pay-
ments denominated in different currencies. There is
no exchange of principal in an interest rate swap, but a
principal payment is exchanged at the beginning and
upon maturity of a currency-swap agreement.
The swaps market originated in the late 1970s, when
simultaneous loans were arranged between British
and U.S. entities to bypass regulatory barriers on the
movement of foreign currency. The first-known foreign
currency swap transaction was between the World
Bank and IBM in August 1981 and was arranged by
Salomon Brothers (Das 1994, 14–36). This landmark
transaction paved the way for the development of a
market that has grown from a negligible volume in the
early 1980s to a notional principal outstanding of
US$46.380 trillion at the end of 1999 (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2000).1 Currently, the swaps market
offers a broad range of ﬁnancing instruments, liquid
swaps in most currencies, and a wide spectrum of
well-established portfolio-management applications.
The Government of Canada has been using interest
rate swaps to help manage its foreign currency liabilities
since fiscal 1984/852 and its Canadian-dollar liabilities
1. The US$46.380 trillion 1999 year-end total consisted of US$43.936 trillion in
interest rate swaps and US$2.444 trillion in currency swaps.
2.  A ﬁscal year is the time between yearly settlement of ﬁnancial accounts.
The ﬁscal year of the Canadian government ends on 31 March.
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since 1987/88.3 These transactions were designed to
help the government obtain ﬂoating-rate funding4 at
more attractive rates than by issuing short-term, ﬁxed-
income securities. Similarly, the government has used
currency swaps to provide low-cost, indirect foreign
currency funding to help manage its foreign currency
liabilities since 1984/85 and its Canadian-dollar liabil-
ities since 1994/95. At the end of 1999/00, the
notional value of the government’s swap portfolio
stood at Can$23.5 billion.
The swaps market offers a broad
range of ﬁnancing instruments,
liquid swaps in most currencies, and
a wide spectrum of well-established
portfolio-management applications.
This article describes the characteristics of swap agree-
ments and the motivation behind the federal govern-
ment’s use of these transactions. The valuation of
swap agreements and the government’s management
of credit-risk exposure are also examined, together
with the manner in which swap transactions are under-
taken to satisfy the government’s various objectives.
Finally, the article illustrates the cost-effectiveness of
the federal government’s use of swap agreements.
Characteristic Features of Swap
Agreements
Swap agreements are used to manage risk in ﬁnancial
markets, to exploit opportunities for arbitrage in capi-
tal markets, and to avoid adverse market conditions
or regulations. Swaps are also used in asset/liability
management to obtain cost-effective ﬁnancing and to
generate higher risk-adjusted returns (Kolb 1999,
608–47). Although exchange-traded derivatives, such
as interest rate and foreign currency futures, could be
3.  This article extends Thibault’s (1993) study of the role of interest rate
swaps in managing Canada’s debt. The swaps discussed here should not be
confused with Exchange Fund Account swaps, which are used to manage the
government’s day-to-day Canadian-dollar cash balances. For more informa-
tion on Exchange Fund Account swaps, see Nowlan (1992). Also, not dis-
cussed in this article are the Bank of Canada’s foreign currency swap facilities
with other central banks (see Bank of Canada 2000, 57).
4.  The government deﬁnes “ﬂoating-rate” funding as debt that matures
within one year, or that matures beyond one year but has a variable interest
rate (Finance Canada 2000, 14-15).
used instead, the swaps market offers several advan-
tages. First, swap agreements are undertaken pri-
vately, while transactions using exchange-traded
derivatives are public. Second, since swap products
are not standardized, counterparties can customize
cash-ﬂow streams to suit their requirements.
The swaps market does have limitations, however.
The privacy of swap agreements exposes counterpar-
ties to the risk of default, since there are no explicit
performance guarantees on contracts, such as those
provided through the clearing houses of futures and
options exchanges. It is difﬁcult to alter or terminate a
swap agreement after its inception, and it can be difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd a counterparty willing to take the opposite
side of a speciﬁc transaction. The latter limitation has
been alleviated in recent years as the number of swap
facilitators has increased.5
In a typical interest rate swap, one counterparty
agrees to exchange a ﬁxed rate of interest on a speciﬁc
notional principal in return for a ﬂoating rate of inter-
est on the same notional principal. The arrangement
also stipulates the term to maturity of the agreement.
No principal is exchanged in this transaction. The
interest rate on the ﬂoating leg of the swap transaction
is typically reset at the beginning of each interest-pay-
ment period, and the cash interest payment is made at
the end of the period. The London Interbank Offered
Rate, or LIBOR, is commonly used as the ﬂoating rate.6
Payments between counterparties are usually netted,
and a single amount is settled on each payment date.
Figure 1 illustrates an interest rate swap. In this exam-
ple, counterparty A pays counterparty B the ﬂoating
rate, and B pays A the ﬁxed rate over the term of the
swap agreement.
A currency swap is a contract between two or more
counterparties to exchange streams of payments
5.  Swap facilitators are ﬁrms that assist in the completion of swap transac-
tions, through informational intermediation, market making, and by serving
as counterparties.
6. LIBOR is the interest rate offered by a speciﬁc group of London banks for
deposits in the Eurocurrency market with maturities that range from one
month to one year.
Figure 1
The Structure of an Interest Rate Swap
Counterparty
A
Interest payment at a ﬂoating rate
Counterparty
B
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denominated in different currencies, with each stream
calculated using a different interest rate. When a typi-
cal currency swap is initiated, one party exchanges the
principal in one currency for an equivalent amount
denominated in another currency. The principal is
converted to the other currency using the then-current
spot exchange rate. Each counterparty makes interest
payments on the principal received at each settlement
date over the life of the swap. These payments are not
netted. At the end of the swap agreement, principal
payments are exchanged using the spot exchange rate
that prevailed when the contract was initiated. The
most common type of currency swap involves an
exchange of interest payments at a ﬁxed rate in one
currency for ﬂoating LIBOR payments in U.S. dollars.
Figure 2 illustrates this type of currency swap. In this
example, counterparty A pays counterparty B the
ﬂoating rate in U.S. dollars, and A receives from B the
other foreign currency ﬁxed rate over the term of the
swap agreement. At the inception of the agreement, B
pays A the principal in U.S. dollars, while A pays B
the principal in the other foreign currency. At the ter-
mination of the agreement, these principal payments
are reversed.
The terms and conditions of most swap contracts are
set so that the initial market value is zero. However, as
interest rates and exchange rates change, swap values
change. A swap’s market value is deﬁned as the dif-
ference between the present value of one party’s
receive-side and pay-side cash ﬂows. Swap valuation
is important for measuring performance and exposure
to credit risk. Box 1 provides an overview of swap-val-
uation procedures.
Government Use of Swap Agreements
As ﬁscal agent for the federal government, the Bank of
Canada undertakes swaps to allow ﬂexibility in its
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management of the government’s liabilities and to
obtain cost-effective Canadian-dollar and foreign cur-
rency ﬁnancing. Between 1987/88 and 1994/95, inter-
est rate swaps were used extensively to convert ﬁxed-
rate Canadian securities into ﬂoating-rate liabilities
under the domestic interest rate swap program. The
government currently uses swap agreements in two
ways. First, under the domestic currency-swap pro-
gram, the government converts issues denominated
in Canadian dollars into foreign currency liabilities.
Second, by using foreign interest rate and currency
swaps, the government exchanges various foreign
currency, fixed-rate issues into foreign currency, floating-
rate liabilities. The domestic currency-swap program
began in 1995, and the foreign interest rate and
currency-swap programs began in 1985.
The Bank of Canada undertakes
swaps to allow ﬂexibility in its
management of the government’s
liabilities and to obtain cost-effective
Canadian-dollarandforeigncurrency
ﬁnancing.
Between 1987 and 1995, the objective of the domestic
interest rate swap program was to convert ﬁxed-rate
Canadian debt into ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing. Swap
transactions allowed the government to achieve ﬂoat-
ing-rate ﬁnancing at a rate below the yield on three-
month treasury bills. Figure 3 shows the structure of a
typical domestic interest rate swap. The ﬁxed interest
rate payable to the government by the swap
Figure 3
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Box 1: Swap Valuation—An Overview
A typical interest rate swap can be valued by char-
acterizing the instrument as a combination of two
bonds. For example, the swap illustrated in
Figure 1 is equivalent to a transaction in which
counterparty A buys a ﬁxed-rate bond from coun-
terparty B and sells B a ﬂoating-rate bond. The
value of the swap to A at any particular date is
given by the present value of the ﬁxed-rate bond
less the present value of the ﬂoating-rate bond.1
Hence, the value of an interest rate swap depends
on the yield curve of swap interest rates.2 The swap
1.  The present value of a bond is calculated by multiplying each of its
individual cash ﬂows by present-value factors that are derived from the
yield curve of swap interest rates. (See Ron 2000.) Essentially, these
present-value factors represent the amount that must be invested at the
time of the calculation in order to reach a value equal to one monetary
unit, taking into account the time to payment and the appropriate
“spot” rate extracted from the yield curve of swap rates. A spot rate is
an interest rate associated with a single cash ﬂow received on a speciﬁc
date. For more detail on spot rates and present-value calculations, see
Whittingham (1996–97).
2.  The yield curve of swap interest rates describes the relationship
between “plain vanilla” interest rate swap ﬁxed rates and time to matu-
rity. A “plain vanilla” interest rate swap is one whose ﬂoating rate is set
equal to the ﬂoating-rate index (the three-month BA rate in the case of a
Canadian-dollar-denominated swap or three-month LIBOR in the case of
a U.S.-dollar-denominated swap) and whose market value is zero. Ron
(2000) describes a method for deriving the yield curve of swap interest
rates.
market is generally liquid and transparent enough
that such yield curves are available for most cur-
rencies. At inception, the ﬁxed rate on most interest
rate swaps is calculated so that the ﬁxed and ﬂoat-
ing sides have the same present values, making the
initial value zero. Because the swap curve shifts
over time, however, the value of the swap to each
party can be either positive or negative.
A similar procedure can be applied to price a typi-
cal currency swap. For example, the swap illus-
trated in Figure 2 is equivalent to a transaction in
which counterparty A buys a foreign currency
ﬁxed-rate bond from counterparty B and sells B a
U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-rate bond. Principal amounts
in the two currencies are exchanged at both the
inception and the termination of the swap agree-
ment. The value of the swap to A is given by the
value of the foreign currency, ﬁxed-rate bond (con-
verted to U.S. dollars at the current exchange rate)
less the value of the U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-rate bond.
Thus, the value of the currency swap depends on
the domestic and foreign yield curves and on the
spot exchange rate. As in the case of interest rate
swaps, the ﬁxed rate on most currency swaps is set
so that the value of the swap is zero at inception.
After this, the value changes with shifts in the two
yield curves and in the spot exchange rate.
counterparty generally corresponded to the yield
of an existing Canada bond with a similar matu-
rity. The ﬂoating interest rate payable by the fed-
eral government was based on the rate on a three-
month banker’s acceptance (BA), a standard ﬂoat-
ing-rate benchmark in the Canadian market. The
difference between the ﬂoating rate payable by the
government and the BA rate—referred to as the
swap spread7—is a rough indicator of the govern-
7. In the Canadian swap market, the term “swap spread” is usually used
to describe the difference between the ﬁxed rate on the swap and the
yield on a Canada bond with the same term to maturity, when the
ﬂoating rate is the three-month BA rate. Government swaps are usually
structured so that the government receives the comparable Canada bond
yield and pays a spread below the BA rate.
ment’s comparative advantage in the ﬁxed-rate
domestic market.8 Table 1 shows the number of
transactions, the notional amounts, and the swap
spreads associated with this program. The domestic
interest rate swap program has been inactive since
1994/95. As the government’s comparative advan-
tage narrowed, the government shifted towards tar-
geting a higher level of ﬁxed-rate funding (Finance
Canada 1999, 14). In addition, the government
8.  The government possesses an absolute borrowing advantage in the
Canadian markets for ﬂoating- and ﬁxed-rate debt, since it is the low-cost
borrower in both markets. In addition, it enjoys a comparative advantage in
the longer-term, ﬁxed-rate market. Comparative advantage refers to the fact
that the difference between the cost of borrowing for the government and
other borrowers is larger in the long-term, ﬁxed-rate market than in the
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decided that its comparative advantage could be put
to better use in the domestic currency-swap program.
The current domestic currency-swap program con-
verts Canadian-dollar-denominated debt into foreign
currency ﬁxed- or ﬂoating-rate funding. This program
has become one of the government’s primary sources
of foreign exchange reserves and a major component
of its swap business. Table 2a shows the rapid rise in
the cumulative notional amount outstanding of this
program. Table 2b isolates the U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-pay
domestic currency-swap transactions, along with the
yield spreads below LIBOR, which give a very rough
indication of cost-effectiveness. The program’s cost-
effectiveness (and that of the domestic interest rate
swap program) is discussed later in more detail.
Figure 4 shows the structure of a typical operation in
the domestic currency-swap program. This swap is
similar to that depicted in Figure 3 except that instead
of paying a ﬂoating rate in Canadian dollars, the gov-
ernment pays a ﬁxed rate in a foreign currency. In
addition, at the inception of the agreement, the gov-
ernment pays the principal in Canadian dollars and
receives the principal in the foreign currency; these
transfers of principal are reversed when the swap is
terminated.Thegovernmentusestheforeigncurrency
principal received to increase its holdings of foreign
exchange reserves while the swap is outstanding. By
undertaking this transaction, the government obtains
ﬁxed-rate, foreign currency funding at a cost below
that of a direct issue of debt denominated in a foreign
currency.
The government has used interest rate swaps and cur-
rency swaps to convert foreign currency, ﬁxed-rate
government issues into foreign currency ﬂoating-rate
liabilities since 1984/85. The use of these swaps is part
of the government’s overall approach to maintaining
and managing foreign exchange reserves. The timing
of the use of these swaps, as indicated by the ebbs and
ﬂows of transactions made under this program and
shown in Table 3, is determined by market conditions.
All of the recent transactions have converted ﬁxed-
rate issues in various currencies9 into ﬂoating-rate lia-
bilities denominated in U.S. dollars, although six
swaps transacted in 1989/90 and 1990/91 were
swapped into ﬂoating-rate Japanese yen.
9.  Most of the underlying issues were denominated in U.S. dollars and Japa-
nese yen, but other currencies include Australian, New Zealand, and Hong
Kong dollars, as well as British pounds, Norwegian kroner, Danish kroner,
and Greek drachma.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the government’s foreign
currency interest rate swaps allow it to acquire ﬂoat-
ing-rate, foreign currency ﬁnancing at a lower cost
than by directly issuing foreign currency, ﬂoating-rate
debt.10 The government’s foreign currency swaps, an
example of which is illustrated in Figure 6, enable the
government to transform a ﬁxed-rate, non-U.S.-dollar
liability into a cost-effective ﬂoating-rate liability in
another foreign currency, usually U.S. dollars. Once
again, there is an exchange of principal at the incep-
tion and termination of the swap agreement. Table 4
summarizes the government’s swap programs.
The government’s swap
counterparties must meet strict
criteria regarding creditworthiness,
and the government also applies
conservative exposure limits to
counterparties based on guidelines
suggested by the BIS.
The government’s swap counterparties must meet
strict criteria regarding creditworthiness, and the gov-
ernment also applies conservative exposure limits to
counterparties based on guidelines suggested by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (1988).11 Box 2
discusses the BISmethodology in more detail and how
the government applies it. All swap agreements
between the government and a given counterparty are
covered by a single contract. The terms of these con-
tracts are based on a standard document created by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) (1991, 1998), with some clauses reﬂecting the
government’s status as a sovereign borrower. Swap
counterparties include many of Canada’s chartered
banks as well as international banks, securities ﬁrms,
and afﬁliates of insurance companies.
10.  See the article by De Leon (2000-01) on page 13 for more information on
the government’s foreign funding programs.
11.  To be eligible to carry out swap business with the government, a counter-
party must have a credit rating of Aor better from two of ﬁve speciﬁed credit-
rating agencies of which one must be Standard & Poors or Moody’s. How-
ever, the minimum counterparty rating for swaps with terms to maturity
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Box 2: Swaps and Credit Risk—An Overview
Swap agreements entail two dimensions of credit
risk. The ﬁrst is the actual credit risk, which repre-
sents the cost of replacing a swap if the counter-
party defaults at the time of the calculation. Actual
credit risk is relevant if the default occurs when the
swap has a positive market value1 to a party; other-
wise, the default has no ﬁnancial impact on this
party in the transaction. This risk exposure is com-
plicated if the defaulting counterparty holds a
number of outstanding swaps, because the default-
ing counterparty can choose to shirk its obligations
only on those swaps with negative market values.
To guard against this possibility, most parties have
one master agreement with each counterparty that
includes an early-termination provision covering
all the transactions under the master agreement.
In regulatory parlance, this is called a “netting”
arrangement. All Government of Canada swaps
are covered by one master agreement with each
counterparty.
The second dimension of credit risk in swap agree-
ments is potential credit risk. This refers to the pos-
sibility that the actual exposure to risk will increase
from its current level and depends on changes in
the probability that a counterparty will default and
on future market conditions.
The Government of Canada currently employs the
framework for measuring swap credit risk devel-
oped by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).2 According to this framework, total exposure
to credit risk is the sum of the current and potential
exposure. In the absence of a legally enforceable
netting agreement, the total actual risk with respect
to a particular counterparty is the sum of all the
positive swap values, while total potential risk is
the sum of the potential risk of all the individual
contracts. The potential exposure of each contract is
calculated by multiplying its notional value by a
credit-conversion factor. These factors are listed in
the table below. For example, the potential
1.  The market value of a swap reﬂects current market conditions. Swap
valuation is discussed in Box 1 on page 26.
2.  The Bank of Canada is also examining other techniques for modelling
credit risk to supplement and enhance the BIS framework. Caouette, Alt-
man, and Narayanan (1998) present a variety of alternative credit-risk
models.
exposure on a US$100 million ﬁve-year interest rate
swap is US$0.5 million, whereas on a US$100 mil-
lion ﬁve-year currency swap it would be US$5.0
million. If these contracts were the only two with a
particular counterparty, the total potential expo-
sure would be US$5.5 million.
The BIS framework recognizes the beneﬁts of net-
ting by calculating the current exposure to each
counterparty as the maximum value of the sum of
market values of all outstanding swap contracts or
zero. The potential exposure is calculated by multi-
plying the notional underlying principal, adjusted
for the credit-conversion factor, by the following
scaling factor:
,
where N is the net replacement cost, which repre-
sents the maximum market value of the entire
swap portfolio held by a counterparty, or zero; G is
the gross replacement cost, which represents the
sum of the positive swap values; and  is a mini-
mum weight that ensures the maintenance of some
protection against adverse ﬂuctuations in the net
replacement cost. The maximum value of is one,
at which the scaling factor is also one and no net-
ting beneﬁts are recognized by the potential expo-
sure calculation. The government has adopted the
BIS’s recommendation of . The scaling
factor also reﬂects the extent to which the swaps
with a particular counterparty are proﬁtable. For
example, if all of the swaps with a particular coun-
terparty (with whom netting agreements are in
place) are proﬁtable, the net and gross replacement
costs are equal (N=G), the scaling factor would be
one, and there would be no potential exposure
reduction.
Swap Conversion Factors
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Table 1
Domestic Interest Rate Swap Program
Fiscal Number of Notional Cumulative Swap spreada
year transactions amount outstanding (basis points













2 300 300 -93
14 1,250 1,550 -79
30 2,300 3,850 -101
22 1,425 5,275 -88
15 850 5,775 -73
26 2,500 7,775 -66
11 1,100 8,050 -46
1 100 6,425 -40
121 9,825 -78
a. The average swap spreads are weighted by transaction volumes.
Table 2a
Domestic Currency-Swap Program
Fiscal Number of Notional amount Cumulative
year transactions transacted outstanding
notional amount
US$-pay Euro-pay US$-pay Euro-pay
(Can$ (Can$ US$-pay Euro-pay









1 0 400 0 400 0
1 0  681 0 1,081 0
2 0 1,360 0 2,441 0
13 0 5,053 0 7,494 0
57 2 6,925 142 14,419 142
12 45 1,276 4,236 14,940 4,378
86 47 15,695 4,378
Table 2b
Can$ Fixed-Pay/US$ Floating-Pay Swaps
Fiscal Number of Notional Cumulative Swap spreada
year transactions amount outstanding (basis points








10 4,067 4,067 32
51 5,694 9,762 35
10  982 10,389 38
71 10,744 34
a. The average swap spreads are weighted by transaction volumes.
Figure 4
The Government’s Use of Domestic Currency Swaps
Government
of Canada
Fixed rate in Canadian dollars
Counterparty
Fixed rate in foreign currency










Foreign Interest Rate and Currency Swaps
Fiscal Number of Notional amount Cumulative
year transactions transacted outstanding
notional amount
US$-pay Yen-pay US$-pay Yen-pay
(US$ (Yen US$-pay Yen-pay



















1 0 500 0 500 0
4 0  1,810 0 2,310 0
1 0 120 0 2,430 0
1 0 556 0 2,986 0
0 0 0 0 2,986 0
0 1 0 10 2,036 10
7 5 675 50 2,301 60
0 0 0 0 2,301 60
0 0 0 0 1,745 60
0 0  0 0 1,625 0
0 0 0 0 1,625 0
00 00 0 0
00 00 0 0
12 0 982 0 982 0
9 0 2,045 0 3,027 0
0 0 0 0 3,001 0
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Figure 5
The Government’s Use of Foreign Interest Rate Swaps
Government
of Canada
Fixed rate in foreign currency
Counterparty
Floating rate in foreign currency
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At the beginning of each fiscal year, the Bank of Canada
and the Department of Finance establish a debt-
management strategy. This strategy establishes fund-
ing targets in terms of amounts to be issued and the
predictability of the interest costs of the liabilities
issued to achieve these targets. The target amount is
based on a combination of the government’s Cana-
dian-dollar-denominated ﬁnancial requirements and
its desired level of foreign exchange reserves.
Although the strategy determines the amount of for-
eign currency debt to be issued, the breakdown in
terms of currencies is a tactical decision made jointly
by the Bank and the Department of Finance, and is
based on issuance and reinvestment opportunities.
The cost-predictability decision is based on the trade-
off between long-term, ﬁxed-rate debt and less-pre-
dictable, but (usually) cheaper, short-term ﬂoating-
rate debt. Once the strategy is established, a debt pro-
gram is developed and implemented. It is at this point
that swaps play an important role.
For example, when the domestic interest rate swap
program was active, the debt strategy was based on a
preference for issuing ﬂoating-rate debt. The program
achieved this objective cost-effectively by capitalizing
on the Canadian government’s comparative advan-
tage at the longer end of the domestic yield curve.
Currently, the government wants to increase its
foreign exchange reserves and is using currency
swaps to effectively convert Canadian-dollar-denomi-
nated fixed-rate bonds into synthetic fixed-rate,
Figure 6
The Government’s Use of Foreign Currency Swaps
Government
of Canada
Fixed rate in foreign currency 1
Counterparty
Floating rate in foreign currency 2





Foreign currency 2 principal
Foreign currency 1 principal
Inception Termination
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euro-denominated bonds.12 The government also
stands ready to issue bonds in other currencies and to
use swaps to convert them into synthetic instruments
that suit its overall targets for holding foreign currency.
In the domestic swap program, transactions are gener-
ally spread more or less uniformly across the entire
ﬁscal year to diversify swap spreads. As shown in
Chart 1, domestic swap spreads can be quite variable.
By spreading out the trades, the Bank also avoids tak-
ing speculative positions on the future directions of
currencies and interest rates—obviously an inappro-
priate activity for a central bank.13 However, the Bank
can, and does, increase or decrease the frequency and
size of transactions according to market conditions
and the volume of transactions concluded earlier in
the ﬁscal year. As a relatively large participant in the
Canadian-dollar swap market, the Bank is cognizant
of the potential impact of its domestic swap transac-
tions on the market and paces the program accordingly.
12. As detailed in De Leon (2000–01), the Exchange Fund Account investment
guidelines prescribe that the government’s foreign currency assets and liabili-
ties are to be managed on the basis of matching currencies and maturities.
They also prescribe limits to credit-risk exposure that can restrict investment
opportunities. Since mid-1999, these rules have meant that the proceeds of
euro-pay swaps can be invested more proﬁtably than the proceeds of U.S.-
dollar-pay or Japanese-yen-pay swaps.
13.  In fact, the government’s own treasury risk-management guidelines for-
bid the taking of ﬁnancial positions based on views regarding future move-
ments in ﬁnancial markets, particularly interest rates and exchange rates.
However, operational staff are permitted to exercise judgment in executing
the best available transactions to meet risk and strategic treasury objectives in
a cost-effective and prudent manner.
Chart 1
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Spread between ﬁve-year
Canadian-dollar swap ﬁxed rates
and ﬁve-year Canada bond yields
The Bank is also mindful that one of the government’s
strategic debt-management objectives is to maintain a
well-functioning market for Government of Canada
securities. In keeping with that objective, the Bank
makes every effort to minimize the impact of its swap
activity on that market. Thus, the Bank prefers to deal
with counterparties that are less likely to offset their
additional Canadian interest rate risk exposure with
offsetting positions in government bonds. The ideal
counterparty would want to use the swap transaction
with the Bank to offset a pre-existing or pending asset-
liability imbalance.
Foreign currency swaps are made in a much more
opportunistic fashion. Details on the operation of the
government’s medium-term note and global bond
programs are available in De Leon (2000–01), but
generally the Bank of Canada continuously monitors
global debt markets for attractive borrowing opportu-
nities. The attractiveness of such opportunities is
usually measured in terms of a target level for the
U.S.-dollar ﬂoating rate, expressed as a spread below
U.S.-dollar, three-month LIBOR. The ability to use
swaps together with any new bond issue makes this
target relevant for all borrowing opportunities in vir-
tually any currency and at any term to maturity. In
fact, the swap market has made LIBOR the borrowing-
cost index of choice for almost all global borrowers.
The government’s target is not a ﬁxed number but
varies over time according to funding requirements.
The target can change at any time, according to the
size of the potential issue—the target for small issues
tends to be more aggressive than that for a large
global issue.
Cost-effectiveness
It can be said with certainty that the government’s
swap programs have been cost-effective, given the
role they play in the general borrowing program. The
fact that a particular swap may have required the gov-
ernment to make payments that exceeded its receipts,
in no way affects the savings that the government
made by opting for a swap rather than for an equiva-
lent direct issue of securities. Estimated and projected
savings are summarized in Table 5 for those swap
transactions that allow reasonably accurate calcula-
tion of such costs. It can be seen that the government’s
swap programs have saved at least $500 million since
1988, and this does not include the savings associated
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For example, Tables 1 and 5 show that, on average, the
government effectively achieved ﬂoating-rate funding
via the domestic interest rate swap program at
78 basis points less than the ﬂoating three-month BA
rate. If the government had not entered into these
swap agreements, it would have borrowed directly in
the treasury bill market at yields that were about 13
basis points lower than those on BAS. Hence, the effec-
tive cost saving is about 65 basis points. In dollar
terms, the government saved approximately $338 mil-
lion, if it is assumed that the domestic interest rate
swap program was devoted entirely to replacing
three-month treasury bills in the borrowing program.
Similarly, Tables 2b and 5 show that, on average, the
government effectively achieved U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-
rate funding via the domestic currency-swap program
at 34 basis points less than the ﬂoating three-month
LIBOR rate. If the government had not entered into
these swap agreements, however, it might have issued
more Canada Bills.14 Through most of the late nineties
and into 2000, the government’s direct ﬂoating-rate
funding cost has been about LIBOR less 12.5 basis points,
thus the effective cost saving is about 21.5 basis points.
In dollar terms, if the alternative direct funding cost
Table 5
Estimated and Projected Cost Savings














3-month BA 3-month BA Can$
- 78 bps - 13 bpsd 338 million
3-month LIBOR 3-month LIBOR US$
- 34 bps - 12.5 bps 109 million
3-month LIBOR 3-month LIBOR US$
- 28 bps - 12.5 bps 40 million
3-month LIBOR 3-month LIBOR US$
- 38 bps - 25 bpse 27 million
3-month LIBOR 3-month LIBOR US$
- 38 bps - 12.5 bps 44 million
3-month LIBOR 3-month LIBOR US$
- 28 bps - 12.5 bps 9 million
a. Only swaps transacted on or before 31 March 2000 are considered.
b. The average spreads are weighted by transaction volumes.
c. For swaps that were still outstanding on 31 March 2000, the estimated cost
savings are projected out to the maturity dates of the swaps.
d.Canadian government treasury bills are used as the comparable direct
funding for the domestic interest rate swap program.
e. The higher comparable direct funding spread on the pre-1995 U.S.-dollar,
ﬂoating-pay swaps reﬂects the fact that Canada issued a U.S.-dollar,
ﬂoating-rate note in 1994 at LIBOR less 25 basis points.
f. The spreads reported on the euro ﬁxed-pay swaps are actually ﬂoating-rate
spreads versus U.S.-dollar LIBOR into which the euro ﬁxed-pay swaps
could have been swapped on their respective trade dates. Hence, the
corresponding minimum cost savings are denominated in U.S. dollars.
remains at LIBOR less 12.5 basis points over the lives
of these swaps, the government will save about
US$109 million.
Substantial cost savings have been, and will be, real-
ized on the government’s U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-pay, for-
eign currency swaps. On swaps initiated since 1995,
the average cost is about LIBOR less 28 basis points.
In dollar terms, if the alternative direct funding cost
remains at LIBOR less 12.5 basis points over the
lives of these swaps, the government will save about
US$40 million. On swaps initiated prior to 1995, the
average cost was about LIBOR less 38 basis points, but
the alternative direct funding cost was probably also
lower. For example, in 1994, Canada issued a U.S.-
dollar-denominated, ﬂoating-rate note at LIBOR less
25 basis points. If this 25-basis-point spread is used to
evaluate the pre-1995 U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-pay, foreign
currency swaps, the cost savings would be about
US$27 million.
Calculations on the government’s ﬁxed-pay swaps are
moredifficult toperform, given thepaucity of recorded
information regarding alternative ﬁxed-rate funding
at the time the swaps were initiated. For many of the
more recent domestic fixed-pay currency swaps,
however, records have been kept of what the U.S.-dol-
lar ﬂoating-pay cost would have been on the trade
date. The appendix shows that the government’s cost
savings on any of these swaps into ﬁxed-rate, euro-
denominated bonds should be at least equal to the
cost savings on ﬂoating-pay, U.S.-dollar swaps that
could have been initiated at the same time. As
described in detail in the appendix, this result occurs
because the government’s treasury risk-management
guidelines require that all foreign funding proceeds be
invested on a currency- and maturity-matched basis,
and all such investments typically earn a return that is
close to the funding cost. Hence, these hypothetical
U.S.-dollar, ﬂoating-pay costs, for which records do
exist, can be used to accurately calculate minimum
cost savings on domestic ﬁxed-pay currency swaps.
For example, if all of the euro ﬁxed-pay swaps made
up to the end of 1999/00 had been swapped into U.S.-
dollar ﬂoating-pay swaps, the average cost of this
14. Canada Bills are promissory notes denominated in U.S. dollars and issued
for terms of up to 270 days. From December 1997 (when the government
started swapping Canadian-dollar-denominated, ﬁxed-rate debt into U.S.-
dollar, ﬂoating-rate debt) to 31 March 2000, yields on three-month Canada
Bills have averaged 6 basis points below LIBOR, making the funding-cost esti-
mate of LIBOR less 12.5 basis points rather conservative.33 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2000–2001
hypothetical funding would have been about LIBOR
less 38 basis points. In dollar terms, if the alternative
direct funding cost remains at LIBOR less 12.5 basis
points over the lives of these swaps, the government
will save just over US$44 million.
Similarly, on the government’s ﬁxed-pay swaps of
Canadian dollars to U.S. dollars, the average cost of
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Appendix:
Cost Estimates on Fixed-Pay Swaps—An Example
Near the end of 1999/00, the government entered into
a six-year currency swap in which it committed to pay
a 5.003 per cent ﬁxed rate of interest on E50 million
notional. At that time, the government probably could
have issued ﬁxed-rate, six-year, euro-denominated
bonds that would have paid a 5.378 per cent ﬁxed rate
of interest.1 Hence, the swap will save the government
about 37.5 basis points annually on E50 million over a
period of six years. At the time the swap was initiated,
the government could have alternatively entered into
a six-year swap in which it would have committed to
pay a ﬂoating rate of LIBOR less 34 basis points on
US$48 million notional. Hence, given the estimated
funding cost of LIBOR Less 12.5 basis points, the
U.S.-dollar ﬂoating-pay swap would have saved the
government only about 21.5 basis points on US$48
million over six years.2 Thus, the projected savings on
this swap would be about US$619,200 (US$48 million
x 6 years x 21.5 basis points).
The fact that the euro and U.S.-dollar alternatives are
in different currencies, and that one is ﬁxed rate and
the other is ﬂoating rate, is rendered virtually irrele-
vant by the requirement that all funds so raised must
be invested on a currency- and maturity-matched
basis (footnote 12). Also, a key fact that enables the
two funding alternatives to be compared so directly, is
that the funds so raised can be invested at rates of
return that are very close to the rate of interest paid on
the funding. In fact, as shown in the following analy-
sis, the government’s superior euro-market reinvest-
ment opportunities make the above-calculated
savings only the minimum savings.
The table below shows that if the government had
issued six-year, euro-denominated bonds that paid a
5.378 per cent rate of interest and invested the pro-
ceeds in six-year, euro-denominated bonds that paid
the same rate, the net return on this package would
have been negligible, as would have been the currency
and interest rate risk. However, the government
actually engaged in a six-year, euro-pay currency
1.  The estimated alternative ﬁxed-rate, euro-denominated funding rate was
about 30 basis points over maturity-matched German government bonds,
based on the market yields of existing ﬁxed-rate, euro-denominated Cana-
dian government bonds.
2. In addition to being more expensive, the cost of the ﬂoating-rate, U. S.-dol-
lar funding is also more uncertain than the ﬁxed-rate, euro-denominated cost
because of the potential variability of the 12.5-basis-point funding spread.
However, the spread could be locked in by the issuance of a LIBOR-based,
ﬂoating-rate bond.
swap at a ﬁxed interest rate of 5.003 per cent, and if
the proceeds had been invested in the aforementioned
six-year, euro-denominated bonds, the net return
would have been 37.5 basis points, and the currency
and interest rate risk still negligible.3
If instead, the government raised U.S.-dollar-denomi-
nated, ﬂoating-rate funds at LIBOR less 12.5 basis
points, and reinvested the proceeds at the same LIBOR
less 12.5 basis points, the net return would have been
negligible, as would have been the currency and inter-
est rate risk. However, there would be some reﬁnanc-
ing and reinvestment risk, to the extent that over the
six-year period being evaluated, the funding and
investment spreads (the 12.5 basis points) would not
be guaranteed. If instead, the government had
swapped into six-year, ﬂoating-rate U.S. dollars at
LIBOR less 34 basis points and reinvested at the afore-
mentioned LIBOR less 12.5 basis points, the net return
would have been 21.5 basis points, and the currency
and interest rate risk would again have been negligi-
ble. Also, in this case, the funding spread would have
been locked in, although uncertainty would remain as
to future investment spreads.
Hence, the euro-denominated, ﬁxed-pay swap actu-
ally saved the government at least 37.5 basis points on
E50 million, which will produce savings of at least the
equivalent of US$1,080,000 (US$48 million x 6 years
x 37.5 basis points).4 This is U.S.$460,800 more than
the savings estimated using the more conservative
U.S.-dollar, floating-rate basis, and similar more
substantial savings would be calculated for all of the
government’s ﬁxed-rate, domestic-currency swaps, if
the historical data were available.
3.  To be more precise, there is some marginal currency and interest rate risk
on the reinvestment of the positive net return.
4.  The actual E50 million swapped was converted to U. S. dollars at the
exchange rate prevailing at the transaction’s inception.
Comparative Cost Calculations
As a per cent of notional amount
E50 million US$48 million




5.378 5.003 LIBOR - 0.125 LIBOR - 0.340
5.378 5.378 LIBOR - 0.125 LIBOR - 0.125
0 +0.375 0 +0.215